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SUMMARY 
 
 
The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is pleased to publish the third 
in the series of its Occasional Papers. Occasional Paper No. 3 presents a 
Summary of a Report of a Study on Reconstruction and Capacity Building efforts 
in four Post-Conflict Countries, namely, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Uganda. . The main objective of the study has been to draw lessons of experience 
that could provide a guide to policies, strategies and instruments for post-conflict 
capacity-building initiatives by the Foundation. The four country studies 
highlighted the fact that root causes are different in different countries at 
different times and that they require country-specific approaches to bring 
countries back to the path of peace and development. 
 
The four studies established that the ability to prevent conflict has less to do with 
a scarcity of donor resources than with the lack of thorough understanding of the 
dynamics of conflicts, the underlying stakes and appropriate tools to address 
them. The special needs of societies emerging from the traumas of conflict have 
shortened the development planning cycle in such a way as to demand more 
flexibility of programs and resources and greater responsiveness to emergencies 
that have up to now been handled only through humanitarian and relief 
assistance.  
 
The lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic 
context of the conflict of Rwanda undermined, in many important ways, the 
effectiveness of regional and international interventions in Rwanda. Although, 
the promotion of reconciliation and peace building in the four countries was an 
often-stated aim of most donor programs, there was an obvious lack of technical 
know-how on how to implement and evaluate such activities in a post-conflict 
environment.  
 
While acknowledging that interventions in post-conflict societies are a special 
case, most donors in the four country studies seemed to have been more 
comfortable with planning and undertaking reconstruction projects based on 
“conventional models” of development rather than adopting a radical approach 
that responded to the peculiar exigencies of the moment. The clumsy and slow 
procurement procedures, which, while designed for maximum transparency 
under normal conditions, do not lend themselves to the conditions of post-
conflict emergency situations.  
 
In post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security are essential for sustainable 
development. Broad-based development, important in its own right, also 
contributes to sustainable peace. The centrality of the peace objective implies one 
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important corollary: the importance of appreciating the political environment 
and sensitivities of capacity building interventions.  
 
Capacity building, being a means to an end in a long development process, 
should be integrated as fully as possible in national development policies, plans 
and strategies. In this regard, the development objective in post-conflict 
reconstruction process must be clearly defined, institutional and human resource 
development needs mapped out, and the capacity building strategy clearly 
articulated.  
 
Beneficiary participation in decisions concerning capacity development would be 
critical in every capacity building initiative. Participation is a process by which 
individuals, organizations and communities assume responsibility for their own 
welfare and that of the community, and to develop the capacity in order to 
contribute to their own and their community’s development. Active participation 
of people in defining their real needs tends to raise their esteem, mobilize their 
social energies and help them to shape their social and economic destiny. The 
four country studies demonstrated how institutionally-weakened post-conflict 
governments and societies failed to rise to the occasion and effectively participate 
in matters pertaining to the identification, design and implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation, reconstruction, and capacity building interventions.  
  
The four studies found that effective and efficient coordination of efforts or lack 
of it makes a significant difference in post-conflict reconstruction and capacity 
building. Massive and urgent needs of the immediate post-conflict situations 
together with the presence of many donors eager to provide support, and each 
with its own agenda, presents a scenario which demands effective and efficient 
donor coordination.  
 
Capacity building, the studies argued, should be defined and interpreted in 
broader national development goals and objectives. The four studies 
demonstrated that donor-supported capacity-building initiatives tended to be 
designed and implemented in isolation, without being guided by an explicit 
national policy framework or strategy.  
 
 Thus, a major challenge to reconstruction and capacity building efforts is for 
post-conflict countries to be supported in the identification, design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs that seek to 
rebuild requisite human and institutional capacities to regenerate growth and 
development, reduce social inequalities and poverty.  
 
 Based on the foregoing, any other findings, the studies presented several 
recommendations that could form the basis for developing a framework for a 
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better focus on post conflict reconstruction and capacity building. Among these 
are the need to: 
· Set up a Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Support Unit in 
continental capacity building institutions like ACBF 
· Conflict mapping frameworks to understand the root causes of conflict 
· Institutionalized mechanisms for sharing basic information on partner 
countries 
· Development of tailor-made programs for the development of 
institutional and human resource capacities 
· A paradigm shift in capacity building policies and strategies 
· Community participation in capacity building and all reconstruction 
activities 
· Donor coordination and long-term commitment 
· Develop a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) for the capacity building aspect 
· Assist in the development of national capacity building frameworks and 
strengthening capacities of critical national institutions 
· Policies to reduce social and economic inequalities 
 
Thus, from the study of the four countries – Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone 
and Uganda, it is evident that attainment of peace is a long term process that 
requires a good understanding of the root causes of a conflict, while effective 
reconstruction requires policies, programs, strategies and institutions for 
building/rebuilding human and institutional capacity. 
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THE AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING FOUNDATION - PROFILE 
 
 
 
The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) was established on 9 February 1991 
through the collaborative efforts of the African Development Bank, the United Nations 
Development Program, The World Bank, bilateral donors and African governments. The 
Foundation represents a response to the severity of Africa’s capacity problems and the 
challenge to invest in indigenous human and institutional capacity in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The Foundation’s mission is to build capacity for sustainable development and 
poverty reduction in Africa. 
 
At its establishment, ACBF focused on providing financial and technical support to the 
building and strengthening of Economic Policy Analysis and Development Management 
capacity in sub-Saharan Africa. However, since January 2000 the Foundation’s mandate 
has been expanded, following the integration of the Partnership for Capacity Building in 
Africa (PACT) initiative into its fold. Under the expanded mandate, the Foundation 
seeks to achieve three main objectives, namely: 
 
· To provide an integrated framework for a holistic approach to capacity building in Africa. 
· To build a partnership between African governments and their development partners, 
which allows for effective coordination of interventions in capacity building and the 
strengthening of Africa’s ownership, leadership and responsibility in the capacity-
building process. 
· To provide a forum for discussing issues and processes, sharing experiences, ideas and 
best practices related to capacity building, as well as mobilizing higher levels of 
consciousness and resources for capacity building in Africa.   
 
The expansion of ACBF’s mandate has broadened its intervention to six core 
competence areas in capacity building as follows: 
 
· Economic Policy Analysis and Development Management. 
· Financial Management and Accountability. 
· Enhancement and Monitoring of National Statistics. 
· Public Administration and Management. 
· Strengthening of Policy Analysis Capacity of National Parliaments. 
· Professionalization of the Voices of the Private Sector and Civil Society. 
 
So far, ACBF has made a major stride within the limit of its resources in the 
implementation of its mandate.  To date, it has committed more than US$200 million to 
capacity building in 37 African countries and in the strengthening of Africa’s regional 
organizations to take forward more purposefully commitment to regional integration. It 
is currently implementing a Strategic Medium Term Plan, 2002-2006 with a planned 
commitment of US$340 million. By the end of the Plan, the Foundation will be present in 
all sub-Saharan Africa. ACBF is a significant partner institution to NEPAD with which it 
signed a memorandum of understanding in January 2004 and of the African Union, the 
Commission of which it is providing capacity building support. 
 viii 
 
Beside direct intervention in capacity building, the Foundation serves as a platform for 
consultation, dialogue and cooperation among development stakeholders and partners.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the realm of peace and security in Africa, the 1990s and beyond witnessed 
dramatic and profound changes throughout the African Continent. With the end 
of the Cold War, some of the major tensions between East and West over Africa 
were markedly eased. South Africa and Namibia installed democratically elected 
governments. Relative peace and stability was established in Mozambique, after 
three decades of confrontation between the warring parties. Several dozen 
African countries held democratic elections. Unquestionably, all these were 
positive and significant signs of peace, stability and development. However, 
while many parts of the world moved toward greater stability as well as political 
and economic cooperation, Africa has remained one of the cauldrons of political 
instability. Political insecurity and violent conflict in Somalia, Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi 
were persistent features of the development scene in Africa. Internal strife with 
deep historical roots surfaced in many countries on the Continent. Ironically, 
while the international community paid less attention to the African security 
affairs, the continent’s institutional and human capacity to manage its pervasive 
conflicts also needed commensurate development to cope with reconstruction 
efforts. 
 
Ideally, every post-conflict reconstruction effort seeks to respond to the urgent 
needs of societies emerging from armed conflicts and works to improve the 
efforts of key actors in rehabilitation and reconstruction operations by 
identifying and filling gaps within the current capacities of local and 
international actors. The Report, which synthesizes experiences from 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda, examines why key 
international development actors and local agents adopted different 
reconstruction plans and strategies to respond to more or less similar post-
conflict situations. It is argued that while strategies obviously inform planning, 
in practice, planning also helps refine strategies by framing and assessing 
alternative approaches, identifying differing actor interests and tradeoffs, and by 
highlighting policy disconnects for decision makers. 
 
 
This report, after the introduction, is divided into five substantive sections. 
Section two examines the essence of conflict and conflict mapping. Sections three 
and four briefly look at the methodology, conceptual framework and the scope of 
the study. Section five discusses the capacity building environment in Africa. The 
last section provides a summary of lessons from the four countries.    
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II.  ESSENCE OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MAPPING 
 
(a) Root Causes of Conflict 
 
Conflict is inherent in all societies. Differences in interests and opinions between 
groups and countries are natural, but how such differences are expressed and 
managed determines if conflicts will manifest themselves in primarily political 
(non-violent) or violent ways. When groups within a society pursue their 
objectives in accordance with the laws and established norms of that society, 
conflict tends to be predominantly political.1 In other cases, however, groups 
turn to violence to pursue their interests, and the use of violence outweighs the 
use of political means. A better understanding of what affects the level and 
dynamics of conflict can ensure that policy interventions do not instigate, 
exacerbate, or revive situations of violent conflict, but instead, if well designed 
and implemented, can help reduce conflict.  
 
Widespread societal conflicts in Africa are often played out against the backdrop 
of deep poverty, illiteracy and weak systems of governance. Undermined by 
unfavorable terms of trade, indebtedness and administrative failures, most states 
in Africa have not responded adequately to the critical social needs of their 
citizens. The economic and human costs of these conflicts have been extremely 
high. In the most extreme cases, African insecurity has been reflected in 
traumatic episodes of collapsed and/or “fragile states”. Almost invariably, state 
collapses are products of long-term degenerative politics marked by a loss of 
control over the economic and political space.  As would be expected, collapsed 
states in Africa, as in other parts of the world, have had harmful spillover effects 
on neighboring countries. The flow of refugees, heightened insecurity and ethnic 
tensions and the resulting diplomatic conflicts have all engaged substantial 
resources and efforts from relatively stable countries that share borders with 
collapsed states (Zartman, 1995:1-5). In the process, what was once thought to be 
merely domestic conflicts, out of the purview of international organizations such 
as the United Nations (UN), regional organizations such as the African Union 
(AU), or multilateral agencies like the World Bank, have now taken a center 
stage. Since 1980, for example, the volume of the World Bank lending to post-
conflict countries has increased over 800 percent, to US$6.2 billion, and touched 
every region and economic sector (World Bank, 1998:a). 
 
The existence of conflict does not, in itself, necessarily lead to the eruption of 
widespread hostilities. The tolerance and coping capacities of the poor, excluded 
and marginalized sections of society in Africa are legend and manifold. Conflict 
                                                 
1 . In some cases, the state laws themselves promote exclusion, prevent participation, and make 
groups feel that they have no peaceful, political alternative, and that violence is their only option. 
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does engender large-scale violence if structural conditions are present, such as 
authoritarian rule and/or lack of political rights, state weaknesses and lack of 
human and institutional capacity to manage conflict. The risk of an outbreak of 
violence increases when these conditions exist concurrently or are exacerbated by 
other problems, such as manipulation of ethnic or other differences (in religion, 
culture and language), which further fragments society and intensify conflict 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1999; Colletta and Cullen, 2000). 
 
Every conflict has certain basic elements that permit researchers to produce a 
tentative road map. The mapper first gathers information about the history of the 
conflict and its physical and organizational setting. To be sure, a conflict does not 
emerge in a vacuum. Sometimes one conflict is nested within another. The 
second stage is to examine the parties to the conflict. These differ in the direction 
of their involvement, and the importance of its outcome. Primary parties are 
those who oppose one another, have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict 
and exhibit fighting behavior. Secondary parties have an indirect stake in the 
outcome. They are often allies or sympathizers with the primary parties and they 
serve as mediators, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing forces, or donors that 
might intervene to facilitate the management of the conflict. 
 
It is not always possible to distinguish the cause of a conflict from its 
consequences. In fact, as a conflict emerges, cause and consequences tend to 
blend. Hostility might be a consequence of one phase of a conflict and a cause of 
the next. Perceived goal and interest incompatibility is perhaps the most basic 
cause of social conflict. Identity defense is also common, particularly in the 
contemporary world where group awareness and rights have assumed high 
visibility. Cultural differences, and particularly language, are additional sources 
of separateness and difference. They create a sense of self and self-defense, which 
is probably another primary motive for conflict. For effective capacity-building 
interventions, it is important to distinguish clearly the contending goals and 
interest of each party to the conflict in order to achieve the intended objectives. 
 
Moreover, a conflict is constantly moving and changing. Even when parties to 
the conflict are at a stalemate, aspects of a conflict’s context will be changing. 
Runaway responses of parties to one another are made more visible through 
conflict mapping. Dynamics such as unrestrained escalation and polarization 
carry participants away from cooperative resolution toward greater hostility. 
Changes in perception occur within opposing sides, which can reinforce 
runaway responses: stereotyping opponents, seeing them as the negative mirror 
image of itself, and imputing to them increasingly malign motives. In this way, a 
conflict map is able to serve as a conceptual guide to clarify the nature and 
dynamics of a particular conflict. 
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Once conflicts escalate into violence, the major concern of neighboring states, 
civil society, and the international community is to intervene in order to facilitate 
the mediation process and help transform structures that produce insecurity and 
structural violence into positive peace-promoting structures.2 We should hasten 
to point out that conflicts in which the state is an effective arbiter do not present 
particular difficulties since they are manageable within the national framework. 
The problem arises when the state itself is a party to the conflict; for under those 
conditions, external involvement becomes necessary. It is argued in this study 
that a solid foundation establishing peace for development is the creation and 
nurturing of robust democratic institutions. Institutions are hereby understood 
as a set of rules governing the actions of individuals and organizations, and 
encompass the interactions of all relevant parties and negotiations among 
participants. Specifically, countries as well as societies need institutions that 
strengthen organizations and promote good governance, whether through laws 
and regulations, or by coordinating the actions of many players, as in the case of 
international treaties. Institutions that are internally consistent have the lowest 
risk of a breakdown because such institutions are self-reinforcing. For post-
conflict societies, this means a wide distribution of power and no permanent 
exclusion of actors from the political system (World Bank, 2000:3).   
 
(b) Costs of Conflict 
 
During a civil war a society diverts some of its resources from productive 
activities to destruction. This, according to Collier et al. (2003), causes a double 
loss: the loss of what the resources were previously contributing and the loss 
from the damage that they now inflict. The diversion of resources to the war 
effort often causes a decrease in other public expenditures, such as those on 
infrastructure, health and education. During the war, and at times immediately 
after, as was the case in Rwanda and Uganda, the rebel forces tend to target 
physical infrastructure as part of their strategy. The main targets are the 
opponent’s communications and support lines, e.g. telecommunications, airports, 
ports, roads and bridges. They looted and destroyed housing, schools and health 
facilities. 
 
Moreover, as the study on Mozambique has indicated, the cost of the civil war 
can be, to say the least, prohibitive. About 40 percent of Mozambican immobile 
capital in agriculture, communications and administration sectors was 
destroyed. The pre-war transport system had been one of the largest foreign 
                                                 
2 John Galtung makes a clear distinction between “positive” and “negative” peace. Positive peace 
encompasses an ideal of how society should be. It requires that not only all types of violence be minimal or 
non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. The notion of negative 
peace is defined as the end of widespread violent conflict associated with war. It may include prevalent 
social violence and structural violence. For a fine restatement on the subject see Galtung (1995). 
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exchange earners, as goods were transported from and to the neighboring land-
locked states of Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In fact, 208 out of 222 units of 
rolling stock were lost or damaged between 1982 and 1989 (Bruck, 2001). 
 
Severe conflict, especially its most virulent ethnic forms like those in 
Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone destroys much more than buildings and 
power plants. It short-circuits the rules that keep human interaction constructive 
and predictable, targets primarily organizations and individuals who administer 
those rules, and wipes out the most positive forms of social capital. Civil war can 
have the effect of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there are 
expectations of honesty to one in which there is expectation of corruption and 
opportunistic behavior. Once the reputation for honest interaction has been lost, 
the incentive for honest behavior in the future is greatly weakened and the cost 
of enforcing transactions increases exponentially. In this sense, therefore, post-
conflict reconstruction and capacity building is first and foremost an institutional 
challenge.3 Failure to meet that challenge dooms the effectiveness of any external 
facilitation and intervention. 
 
Probably a substantial cost arises from the fear that violence generates in society. 
Frightened people tend not only to shift their capital out of the country to 
environments where the return on investment has not fallen, but more 
ominously, they tend to flee from their homes. During the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, for example, the fleeing Rwandan government looted about 24 billion 
Rwandan francs and substantial amounts of hard currencies from the Central 
Bank. In addition, an estimated 1 million men, women and children were killed 
over a three-month period. The genocide also produced about 3 million refugees 
and 4 million internally displaced persons out of a total Rwandan population 
estimated at 7.7 million. Moreover, frightened people also tend to lose their 
valuable assets in the process. Paul Collier et al. (2003:14-16) have noted that less 
than a fifth of the 1980 cattle stock in Mozambique remained by 1992. Cattle were 
lost because of direct rebel activity, that is, rebels stole them to feed their troops 
and killed many others to spread terror, and also due to the indirect effects of 
warfare, namely, a lack of adequate feed and veterinary attention during the war. 
Faced with the prospect of such losses, people try to protect their assets by 
shifting wealth abroad. The Rwandan case has amply demonstrated how the 
fleeing state official can ransack national coffers. 
 
The more direct effects of civil war are the fatalities and population 
displacements. Violent conflict can decimate the human resources of a country as 
people are killed, maimed, or displaced in large numbers. In the modern civil 
                                                 
3 . All post-conflict societies under study were characterized by a generalized collapse of standards in the 
professions. The rebuilding of standards in the professions: doctors, lawyers, accountants and civil servants 
is likely to be at the core of restoring social capital in the post-conflict reconstruction process. 
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war, the victims differ from those of the early 20th century wars because the 
targets have shifted from military personnel to civilians. At the beginning of the 
20th century, about 90 percent of the victims were soldiers, but by the 1990s, 
nearly 90 percent of the casualties resulting from armed conflicts were civilians 
(Cairns, 1997). Forced migration, broadly defined, consists of two groups: 
refugees and internally displaced persons. The Office of the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported in 1997 that it was responsible for 
the welfare of some 22 million people around the world. Of those, around 13 
million people were refugees in the conventional sense of the word: people who 
have been uprooted by war, violence and violation of human rights throughout 
the world. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for about 35 percent or 7.8 million of 
the world’s refugees and displaced persons (UNHCR, 1997:2-3). 
  
Finally, civil wars are not only costly for the countries in which they are fought, 
but also for the entire regional security complex. Neighboring countries must 
accommodate large numbers of refugees. Moreover, civil war leads to growing 
defense budgets in neighboring countries, spreading diseases, drug production 
and trafficking, and terrorism, as well as tarnishing the reputation of the region 
in the minds of potential investors. 
                     
III. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK  
 
Post-conflict reconstruction, like any other development study undertaking, has 
unique concepts and methodologies that require explanation. The entry point for 
this work is the World Bank study, A framework for World Bank Involvement in 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction (1997). The study identifies a “country conflict” as one 
that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where the preoccupation 
of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or where a significant 
part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the state. In each 
situation, external agencies need to understand the varying histories and nature 
of the “failure” process in order to calibrate informed intervention measures to 
facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace, support the resumption of 
economic and social development, and determine at what point in the post-
conflict process should a particular country be regarded as having achieved a 
relative state of normalcy.4 These observations are very important precisely 
because conflicts are different everywhere and require tailor-made approaches. 
                                                 
4 . The speed of the evolution toward normalcy and the benchmarks for evaluating progress remain 
contentious. The World Bank has tentatively proposed that possible indicators should include: (i) 
macroeconomic stability and its likely sustainability; (ii) recovery of private sector confidence, as measured 
by the investment ratio; and (iii) the effectiveness with which institutional arrangements and the political 
system are coping with the tensions, schisms and behaviors that lay behind the conflict to begin with. For 
details, see World Bank (1998b: 47). 
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They differ, inter alia, in the duration, intensity and scope of destruction, the 
relative military and political strength of the opponents, and the degree to which 
the middle and upper classes are affected by the hostilities. Whereas the conflicts 
in Uganda and Sierra Leone were products of state failure due to predatory or 
ineffectual governance, the Rwandan state erosion was a product of ethnic-cum-
regional conflict and the Mozambican state failure was fueled by ideological 
conflict.  
 
Like post-natural disaster reconstruction, post-conflict reconstruction typically 
involves the repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure; it 
also entails a number of external interventions aimed at rebuilding weakened 
institutions. The state institutions are usually so weakened that they exhibit little 
capacity to carry out their traditional functions. Those critical interventions 
include reviving the economy, reconstructing the framework for democratic 
governance, rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, and planning 
for financial normalization. In contrast, unlike post-natural disaster construction, 
post-conflict reconstruction assistance often operates amid social tensions and 
suspicions between key actors within the country, which can and does influence 
relations among the involved international parties as well. Moreover, a civil war 
alters both the level and the structure of economic activity in ways, which persist 
beyond the war. Arguably, “conflict-blind” reconstruction interventions may, at 
worst, inadvertently exacerbate conflict, and at best, it may simply be irrelevant 
to the issues that force many of a country’s citizens into a situation of violent 
conflict (World Bank, 1998a; Rugumamu, 2001). 
 
As other cross-country studies have demonstrated (e.g. El Salvador, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) unlike post-post disaster reconstruction, post-conflict 
reconstruction interventions are radically different from “normal” operations. 
The devastation of human, social and physical capital often found at the 
beginning of the post-conflict period, as well as the particular provisions of the 
peace agreement, require a paradigm shift when diagnosing and prescribing 
policy interventions. These should be essentially conflict-mitigating. The volatile 
and fast-changing circumstances of post-conflict societies demand a high degree 
of flexibility and speed in the design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of projects and programs. In addition, post-conflict interventions tend 
to have explicit objectives such as supporting the transition from war to peace, 
resumption of economic and social development, reconciliation and 
reconstruction, human and institutional capacity building, and establishing 
special investment funds to maintain social cohesion during the period of 
economic adjustment and poverty reduction and decentralization. Moreover, a 
post-conflict reconstruction process typically requires at least two decades of 
sustained effort, with the risk of war a recurrent threat (Collier, et al. 2001; World 
Bank, 1997; Boyce, 1996). Arguably, conflicts are often protracted rather than 
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limited in duration and tend to tear the country’s social fabric and destroy its 
physical and human capital. Recovery requires incremental planning, careful and 
realistic policy reforms as well as consideration of the post-war constraints and 
peace agreements. Raising taxes in post-conflict situations, for example, may 
discourage private investment. Downsizing the civil service under public sector 
reform programs, may contradict agreements made under the peace accords. 
And standard procurement and disbursement procedures can easily degenerate 
into serious stumbling blocks to recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation. In 
short, post-conflict operations require intensive monitoring to ensure their 
continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and timely preparation of post-
conflict completion reports are required to expedite dissemination of the lessons 
learned (World Bank, 1998a). A paradigm shift for post-conflict reconstruction 
and capacity building is therefore proposed.   
 
It is against this background that most bilateral and multilateral organizations 
have deliberately established post-conflict research units to consolidate 
institutional learning on reconstruction issues. Such units can support staff in 
developing and implementing reconstruction strategies, and act as the focal 
point for partnerships with other members of the international community. 
                      
 
IV. CAPACITY BUILDING – ISSUES OF FOCUS OF THE 
STUDIES 
 
In the four-country studies, we define capacity - including knowledge and 
technology - as the ability of organizations, individuals and societies to identify 
constraints and to plan and manage development effectively, efficiently and 
sustainably. This definition involves both the development of human resources, 
institutions, and society, and also a supportive policy environment. It 
encompasses the process by which individuals, groups, organizations and 
societies develop their abilities individually and collectively, to identify their 
problems and constraints on development, set development objectives, formulate 
policies and programs, perform functions required to solve those problems, and 
achieve a set of development objectives. Each society has the capacities that 
correspond to its own functions and objectives. Non-industrial societies, for 
example, have relatively few formal institutions, but they do have highly 
developed skills and complex webs of social and cultural relationships that are 
often difficult for outsiders to comprehend. In short, capacity-building needs 
should be addressed at three levels: individual, institutional and societal. All 
these layers of capacity are mutually interdependent. If one or the other is 
pursued on its own, development becomes skewed and inefficient (Browne, 
2002:2-4). 
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· Individual: This involves enabling individuals to embark on a continuous 
process of learning – building on existing knowledge and skills, and 
extending these to new directions as fresh opportunities appear. 
· Institutional: This, too, involves building on existing capacities. Rather 
than trying to construct new and alien institutions on the basis of foreign 
blueprints, governments and donors instead need to seek out existing 
initiatives, however nascent, and encourage these to grow. 
· Societal: This involves capacities in the society as a whole, or their 
transformation for development. It encompasses the facilitatory process, 
which lies at the heart of human development: the opening and widening 
of opportunities that enable people to use and expand their capacities to 
the fullest. Social capital and cohesion are at the core of societal capacity 
and apply both nationally and locally. Without such opportunities, soon 
people will find that their skills rapidly erode or become obsolete. And if 
they find no opportunities locally, trained and skilled people will join the 
brain drain and take their skills overseas. 
 
In this regard, therefore, the broad concept of capacity building comprises 
various processes of creating new capacities (capacity creation), effectively 
mobilizing and utilizing existing capacities (capacity utilization) and sustaining 
the created capacity over time (capacity retention). These dimensions of capacity 
development are interactive and dynamic. Briefly, let us elaborate on each of 
these processes. 
 
Capacity Creation: The creation of effective human and institutional capacity rests 
on a strong foundation that facilitates the creation of new capacities through 
learning  opportunities, as well as putting in place processes which enhance the 
adaptability required for dealing with a dynamic environment. Such a 
foundation is created through formal education and training, and informally 
through on-the-job training.  
 
Capacity Utilization: Efficient and effective use of existing capacities is an 
important aspect of capacity building. The failure of most African countries to 
make effective use of their own human resources has been identified as one of 
the major factors retarding development. The cause for the underutilization 
and/or mis-utilization of this critical agent of progress can be traced to the extant 
disenabling environment. In this context, effectiveness and efficiency involve 
taking stock of existing capacities, and mobilizing them to achieve a set of 
development goals. Making the best use of existing capacities will involve 
tapping all of the creative and innovative energy that can be mobilized from 
existing human and institutional capacities.  
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Sustaining Capacity: The capacity that is being created and utilized to realize a set 
of development goals will need to be retained, developed and sustained over 
time. Capacity-building programs and projects will need to be designed to be 
sustainable beyond the initial interventions. Sustaining capacities is more likely 
to occur in the context of a modicum of political and economic stability that is 
supportive of conducive working conditions, ensures low risk of violent social 
conflict, and provides an atmosphere of support for the capacity building efforts 
in society and promotes democratic governance. Sources of funding to 
adequately remunerate workers are an important element of sustainability and 
capacity retention. In the long run, the key to sustaining capacity building 
programs will be the availability of local sources of funding. Sustainable capacity 
building will need to address the capacity to mobilize domestic resources, 
notably government revenues as well as savings and investments. Resource 
mobilization is therefore an important component of capacity building. 
 
Capacity Building Environments: The processes of capacity building are 
embedded in complex environments that affect their ability to achieve the 
intended objectives. At the most general level of analysis is the broad political 
economy environment. This refers to the economic, social and political milieux 
(local, national and international) in which individuals, organizations and society 
attempt to carry out their activities, and the extent to which conditions in the 
environment facilitate or constrain performance. Within this dimension, a broad 
set of factors affect the ability of actors to perform effectively, efficiently and 
sustainably. In terms of economic factors, the level and growth rates of GDP, 
conditions in international commodity and capital markets, the labor market 
situations, the level of private sector development, and the nature and extent of 
development assistance all impinge on virtually all activities carried out by 
government. Politically, actors are affected by factors such as leadership support, 
the extent to which civil society is mobilized, the degree of political stability, and 
the nature and development of political institutions. Social factors are also 
important, e.g. the level of human resource development, tolerance or tensions 
among social groups; social mobilization and needs; the development of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs); and the degree of participation in economic 
and social life. 
 
At the international level, it is important to emphasize that donors will have a 
long- term view of what they want to contribute to – a better health system, 
efficient judiciary or more skilled economists at the national treasury- in a 
capacity-building needs matrix. At the same time, however, they remain 
accountable to their constituencies at home. They feel more comfortable, 
therefore, if they can point to visible activities such as courses at their home 
universities, training manuals, computer systems, and such donor needs 
encourage a bias toward pre-determined projects. Moreover, donors want to 
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retain as much control as possible and avoid accusations that hard-earned 
taxpayer funds were squandered through inefficiency, incompetence or 
corruption. One way of achieving this kind of assurance has been to send in 
expatriates as gatekeepers. 
 
The second dimension of capacity is the institutional environment of the public 
sector that facilitates or constrains the actors’ activities and affects their 
performance. This dimension includes: laws and regulations affecting the civil 
service or private sector and the operation of government, such as hiring, 
promotion, and remuneration policies; the general operating procedures; and 
standards of performance. It includes the financial and budgetary support that 
allows organizations to carry out particular tasks, as well as the policies in effect 
that constrain or hinder performance. The institutional context also includes laws 
and regulations defining responsibilities and power relationships among actors 
and the informal power relationships that often mean some institutions and 
agencies acquire resources or influence policy more effectively than others. Of 
course, not all capacity building activities take place through the public sector. 
All countries are constantly engaged in multiple processes of capacity 
development, in the public sector, civil society and the private sector. 
 
The third dimension of capacity building relates to the coordinated activity of 
multiple organizations that is required to accomplish a given task, i.e., the task 
network. The interactions of organizations within this network can facilitate or 
constrain performance. Some organizations may be more central to a given task 
than others; these are called “primary organizations”. Secondary organizations 
have a less central role in accomplishing the task but are nonetheless essential to 
it. In addition, there are often supporting organizations that provide important 
services that enable a task to be performed. How these networks function and the 
nature of the formal and informal interactions among them are important aspects 
of organizational performance. Within any particular task network, there may be 
organizations from diverse levels of government, and from the private sector and 
NGO sectors. 
 
The fourth and fifth dimensions of capacity building are the organizational and 
human resource bases of the organization. These two levels of analysis are 
closely intertwined. The fourth dimension of capacity building focuses on 
organizational structures, systems, processes, resources, procedures and 
management styles that affect how individual talents and skills are used to 
accomplish particular tasks. It should be pointed out that organizations establish 
goals, structure work, define authority relations and provide incentives and 
disincentives that shape the behavior of those who work within them. The fifth 
dimension of capacity building relates to training and recruitment of managerial, 
professional, and technical talent that contributes to organizational performance. 
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Among these five sets of factors that affect capacity building initiatives, there 
may be some that facilitate effective performance and others that constrain it. 
Case studies research, such as these, can illuminate how various factors have 
influenced capacity building efforts in post-conflict societies and what 
interventions can be made to promote better performance in the future.  
 
           
V. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND CAPACITY 
BUILDING: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Support Unit: The four studies have 
amply demonstrated that the ability to prevent conflict has less to do with a 
scarcity of donor resources than with the lack of thorough understanding of the 
dynamics of conflict, the underlying stakes and appropriate tools to address 
discord. The reconstruction of war-torn societies has become a sub-specialty 
within the broader development studies agenda. The special needs of societies 
emerging from the trauma of conflict have shortened the development planning 
cycle in a way that demands more flexibility of programs and resources and 
greater responsiveness to those emergencies heretofore handled only through 
humanitarian and relief assistance. The need to nurture understanding and 
develop tools has led to the establishment of specific units within bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies to address the development issues of post-conflict 
societies.5 ACBF might consider establishing such a unit that would not only 
backstop its various interventions with well-informed background studies of 
countries or regions but also provide expert advice on how best to mainstream 
conflict prevention and peace-building in all sectors of intervention. An 
adequately equipped and staffed support unit would be one of the preconditions 
for successful intervention in post-conflict situations in Africa. 
 
Understanding the root causes of conflict: The four country studies have 
highlighted the fact that the root causes of conflicts are different in different 
countries at different times, and that they require tailor-made approaches to 
bring countries back to a peace and development path. The conflicts in Uganda, 
Rwanda, Mozambique and Sierra Leone differed, inter alia, in their root causes, 
duration, intensity and scope of the destruction, the relative military and political 
                                                 
5 . The following are some of the most robust post-conflict research units: the Peace Building Unit (CIDA); 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands); Division 
of Humanitarian Assistance (SIDA); Conflict and Human Affairs Department (Department of International 
Development, UK); Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID); European Community Humanitarian Office, 
EU); International Committee of the Red Cross, (Red Cross); Interagency Cooperation Unit (WHO); War-
torn societies Project (UNRISD); Emergency Response Division (UNDP); Office of Emergency Programs 
(UNICEF); and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Fund (World Bank).   
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strengths and resilience of the opponents, and the degree to which the middle 
and upper classes were affected by the hostilities. In this regard, conflict analysis 
and conflict impact assessment studies resulting from the future ACBF Post-
conflict Support Unit must form an integral part of the entire planning cycle of 
every individual program and project undertaken by the ACBF. Such studies 
would most importantly ensure that the Foundation’s interventions in post-
conflict environments do not unwittingly feed into, instigate or perpetuate old 
conflicts. The major responsibilities of such a unit would be to undertake conflict 
mapping of the respective countries by gathering information about the history 
of each conflict and its physical and organizational setting, about parties to the 
conflict, and their goals and interests, and by distinguishing the root causes from 
their consequences. Understanding various histories and their root causes will 
help to inform reconstruction and capacity-building interventions that are likely 
to serve as credible and sustainable conflict mitigation measures for societal 
healing and capacity development. Above all, a deep analysis of conflicts and 
conflict dynamics should also be seen as a prerequisite for addressing politically 
sensitive interventions like addressing regional causes of conflicts, arms 
trafficking, brain drain, demobilization and reinsertion of armed forces, the right 
use of incentives and sanctions to respond to the regional challenges of 
insecurity, democratization and the decentralization of government. 
 
Institutionalized mechanisms for sharing basic information on partner 
countries: The lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and 
economic context of the conflict in Rwanda has undermined, in many important 
ways, the effectiveness of regional and international interventions in Rwanda. 
First, the current study has pointed out how EU member states in Kigali differed 
in their analyses of the current political landscape of Rwanda and the region. In 
fact, they tended to be polarized in their views on Rwanda’s security concerns 
and its prolonged presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.6 To be sure, 
this polarization did help the suffering Rwandans. Second, the four country 
studies have demonstrated pervasive donor ignorance of African realities. 
Although, the promotion of reconciliation and peace-building in the four 
countries was an often-stated aim of most donor programs, there was an obvious 
lack of technical know-how on how to implement and evaluate such activities in 
a post-conflict environment. More specifically, some key members of the 
international community did not immediately recognize the scope and extent of 
involvement of some political leaders in the Rwandan genocide. It comes as little 
                                                 
6 . At the two ends of the spectrum are France and the United Kingdom, with others falling in-between. 
Since the genocide, France, which supported the previous ousted regime, has yet to totally resume its 
structural cooperation with Kigali and is without doubt the most cautious member state. It implements its 
aid activities directly rather than through government channels. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, 
has developed a close development partnership with the Rwandan government and has pledged  long-term 
development support.  
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surprise that some relief agencies used the former leaders to deliver assistance in 
the refugee camps. This new power enabled the very people who had engineered 
the genocide to re-establish their command over the refugees. Moreover, not a 
few human rights observers were totally ignorant of the political history and the 
social and ethnic structures of Rwandan society. Consequently, they failed to 
establish any productive rapport with local leaders or local NGOs, which 
ultimately, proved self-defeating. Thus, the Rwandan experience underscores the 
need not only for information sharing with indigenous counterparts, but most 
importantly, and for the ACBF to take a lead role in collecting, collating, 
analyzing and storing critical data on partner countries and to establish a 
comprehensive networking arrangement for sharing knowledge, information 
and best practices with other specialized national, regional and international 
research networks. That information is power can hardly be overemphasized. 
 
The folly of some conventional wisdom: While acknowledging that interventions 
in post-conflict societies are a special case, most donors in the four country 
studies seemed to have been more comfortable with planning and undertaking 
reconstruction projects based on traditional “conventional models” of 
development rather than undertaking a radical approach that responded to the 
peculiar exigencies of the moment.  It is perhaps not surprising that most donors 
organizational cultures and mandates, particularly multilateral agencies seemed 
to have far more effect on the strategic and operational decisions than concrete 
situations on the ground. Clumsy and slow procurement procedures, which, 
while designed for maximum transparency under normal conditions, do not lend 
themselves to the conditions of post-conflict emergency situations. As the studies 
have revealed, responding uncritically to the devastation of human, institutional, 
social and physical capital that occurred in the four countries tended to fly in the 
face of conventional models of development. Arguably, the delivery of 
emergency supplies, resettling refugees, and the reconstruction of physical and 
social capital require flexible and incremental planning, careful and realistic 
policy reforms, and more critical staff-time than in normal peace-time operations. 
Standard and complex procurement and disbursement procedures and 
questionable policy conditionalities tend to exacerbate rather than mitigate the 
misery and suffering of war-affected populations. Above all, in a world of 
competing needs and scarce resources, “high profile”, short-tem special needs 
programs, rather than long-term, lower profile and less innovative initiatives like 
agrarian reform and public sector reform need to be sensitively planned, 
strategically balanced and prioritized. The former are more popular with donors 
than recipients, e.g. supporting the judicial process around Gacaca in Rwanda. 
ACBF might consider investing in enhancing human resource capacities in post-
conflict societies by organizing various tailor-made training programs for post-
conflict countries at a sub-regional rather than a national level.  
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One of the prerequisites for post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building is 
for partner governments to establish security and promote international 
credibility: During post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security are essential 
for sustainable development. Broad-based development, important in its own 
right, also contributes to sustainable peace. The centrality of the peace objective 
implies one important corollary: that ACBF must appreciate the political 
environment and sensitivities of capacity-building interventions. The political 
environment has two related but distinguishable components: the domestic 
politics of the post-conflict country; and the explicit or tacit framework adopted 
by the international community. On the one hand, the secrets behind 
Mozambique and Uganda’s phenomenal success in their respective political and 
economic transformations have been the maintenance of internal security 
(including complete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the ex-
combatants) and good rapport with key international actors. Much as 
reconciliation, human rights, democratization and justice are preoccupations of 
all donors, due to the political sensitivity of some of these issues, few donors 
have aggressively trod in such areas. Most programs in those areas have tended 
to respect the status quo. As the study on Uganda has revealed, few donors have 
demanded the abandonment of its “no-party democracy” or peaceful 
negotiations with the rebels in the North. By the same token, one hardly hears 
any noise from the international community about “power sharing” in 
Mozambique. At the same time, the less than adequate reconstruction 
performance in Rwanda can be largely explained by the polarization of donors’ 
views about the nature and character of Rwanda’s security problems. France and 
Belgium drastically cut their bilateral assistance to Rwanda; subject to the latter’s 
compliance with the Lusaka Agreements and UN Resolution No. 1304. In this 
regard, the Conflict Support Unit would be mandated to undertake sound 
political analysis of the perceptions of the key international actors in order to 
advise ACBF with whom, when and how to enter into strategic partnerships in 
order to promote coherence, complementarity and coordination in capacity 
building interventions. 
 
A paradigm shift in post-conflict reconstruction and capacity-building policies 
and strategies: Capacity building is a means to an end in the long development 
process. In fact, it is part and parcel of a long development process. It should, by 
definition, be integrated as fully as possible in national development policies, 
plans and strategies. In this regard, immediate development goals in any post-
conflict reconstruction process must be clearly defined, institutional and human 
resources development should be mapped out, and a capacity building strategy 
identified. The key issue for the ACBF would be to assume a leadership role in 
supporting partner governments and other stakeholders to develop a medium-
term, multi-sector capacity-building framework, which would be consistent with 
their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and their long-term 
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development vision.7 The former documents represent the most coherent attempt 
at generating a domestic consensus on a country’s reconstruction agenda. Donors 
must be encouraged to coordinate their activities around PRSP. Moreover, as was 
the case in post-conflict Kosovo, the ACBF might consider persuading the 
Bretton Woods institutions to adopt peace-friendly economic reform programs in 
Africa, including far-reaching debt relief measures, enhanced quality of foreign 
aid, and deliberate capacity-building initiatives (including deliberate measures to 
promote the return of the Diaspora) in support of long-term development efforts 
and post-conflict recovery. In the same vein, the ACBF might consider 
persuading the World Trade Organization (WTO) to invoke its “special and 
differential treatment” trade clause for post-conflict societies.8 Above all, ACBF 
might consider persuading the OECD countries to provide substantive 
investment guarantees to corporations based in their own home countries that 
might wish to invest in any post-conflict economies in Africa. 
 
Community Participation: A growing body of evidence points to the linkage 
between empowerment and development effectiveness both at the society-wide 
level and at the grassroots level. The arguments to support this observation are 
disarmingly simple: when citizens are engaged, exercise their voice, and demand 
accountability, government performance improves and corruption is harder to 
sustain. Moreover, informed citizen participation can also facilitate in building a 
strong consensus to support difficult and politically sensitive reforms needed to 
undertake post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation (Narayan, 2002:xviii). 
Briefly stated, participation is a process by which individuals, organizations and 
communities assume responsibility for their own welfare and that of their 
community, and develop capacity in order to contribute to their own and their 
community’s development. Active participation of individuals in defining their 
real needs tends to raise their esteem, mobilize their social energies and help 
them to shape their social and economic destiny. The four country studies have 
demonstrated how institutionally weakened post-conflict governments and 
societies failed to rise to the occasion and effectively participate in matters 
pertaining to the choice, selection, design and implementation of relief and 
reconstruction interventions. Under the pretext of weak recipient governments, 
donors tended to impose politically visible projects (often with negligible 
immediate or long-term impact on the war victims) and also created dozens of 
                                                 
7. In order to harmonize these policy documents, it is important that the conventional economic  
analysis be supplemented by socio-political analysis so as to identify and broaden a domestic coalition for 
reform and to build ownership for reconstruction. 
8 . Beyond exploiting the services of Africans in Diaspora, Professor Jagdish Bhagwati has proposed a “tax 
on the brain drain”, to be levied on highly skilled immigrants working in the North and on receiving 
countries as a mechanism to support capacity-development in countries in the South. For details see 
Bhagwati (1983).  
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project management units parallel to existing government structures.9 Our 
respondents in Rwanda reported that the government constantly expressed its 
dismay at the lack of aid being channeled directly through its institutions. 
Instead of promoting and strengthening the newly created aid coordination 
instrument, CEPEX, donors were regularly and imprudently bypassing it. It is 
important to remember that, ultimately, the test of the effectiveness of 
international cooperation ultimately centers on the extent to which donors 
successfully promote increased self-reliance in partner countries. ACBF might 
consider joining with progressive forces within the international community that 
genuinely seek to build, empower and strengthen capacities in post-African 
conflict societies by putting its partners at the center of the decision-making 
process. 
  
Donor coordination and long-term commitment: The four-country studies have 
found that effective and efficient coordination or lack of it makes a huge 
difference in post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building. Due to the 
massive, urgent needs of immediate post-conflict situations together with the 
presence of many donors eager to provide support (each with its own agenda), 
there is an imperative for effective and efficient donor coordination. Whereas it is 
true that fragile states lack the requisite capacity even  of articulating their 
pressing needs, this should not provide an excuse for bypassing existing 
government structures and creating separate exogenous project coordination 
units (PCU). These studies have clearly shown that where donor coordination 
and joint approach were instituted such as those by the World Bank in Uganda, 
the United Nations Observation Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), post-conflict reconstruction 
and capacity-building interventions had impressive results. These three lead 
organizations coordinated and integrated damage and needs assessments, and 
allowed integrated planning as well as resource mobilization and utilization. The 
current country studies have also demonstrated that in the absence of effective 
donor coordination such as in Rwanda the opposite was true. Competing donor 
bureaucracies worked at cross-purposes, as some of them either deliberately 
bypassed designated government institutions or imposed onerous 
conditionalities or even both. Our interviewees expressed a preference for either 
the World Bank or the European Union to exercise a leadership role in post-
conflict reconstruction and to commit long-term quality resources to capacity 
building. Some of the benefits accruing from a proactive leadership role by the 
Bank or the Union include the quality of their analytical and advisory services, 
                                                 
9 . The World Bank experience is instructive on this point. In one of its studies, it concluded that “without 
government participation from the early stages…the project is unlikely to reflect the priorities of the 
government. At the implementation stage, the program will be resented and rendered ineffective, regardless 
of the quality of its design, delivery or supervision”. Buyck, B. Technical Assistance as a Delivery 
Mechanism for Institutional Development . Washington, DC: World Bank.1989: 22. 
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their relationships with other donors, their access to the IMF, and their potential 
to mobilize funds from other sources. 
 
ACBF to participate in multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) in order to undertake 
post-conflict institution development and capacity-building: If ACBF assumes a 
lead role in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, it might 
consider participating in future peace negotiations in order to provide capacity-
building advice, post-conflict capacity-building planning and coordination, 
creation of an endowment fund by respective national governments for capacity 
creation, co-financing of operations, joint undertaking of human resource and 
institutional capacity audits in order to identify inadequacies and obstacles to 
capacity-building (use, retention and continuous upgrading of capacities), and 
together with respective beneficiary partners (government, academia, private 
sector and civil society), define their respective capacity needs, priorities and 
sequencing. At the same time, ACBF might also consider participating and, 
where possible, coordinating multi-donor trust funds (MDTF) for capacity-
building initiatives in post-conflict situations in Africa. To be sure, it is unlikely 
that ACBF will independently initiate major capacity-building operations in 
countries with major complex emergencies in the near future. A MDFT program 
would require an agreed-upon program of capacity-building activities, 
ownership by partner government and major potential donors; workable 
interfacing with local aid management agencies; and the fullest possible 
transparency and openings for citizens’ voices. In this regard, close cooperation 
and strategic networking with the European Union, UNDP and the World Bank 
would be crucial in avoiding initiative duplication and ensure that all effort 
made are both compatible and mutually reinforcing. ACBF might also consider 
joining the UNEDIL program, developed by UNDP, the then Economic 
Development Institute (EDI) and the ILO, and financially supported by UNDP 
and some bilateral donors to build indigenous competencies in the sixteen 
African management institutes and three regional organizations to avoid the 
traditional reliance on foreign training and expatriates.     
 
Promote the adoption of an explicit national capacity-building policy 
framework: Capacity building should be defined and interpreted in broader 
national development goals and objectives. These four studies have 
demonstrated that donor-supported capacity-building initiatives tend to be 
designed and implemented in isolation, without being guided by an explicit 
national policy framework or strategy. In war-torn countries where the human 
needs are overwhelming, the duplication of donor efforts is, to say the least, 
scandalous. Worse still, the immediate post-conflict capacity-building projects in 
the four countries were not coordinated at multiple levels: within ministries and 
between governments and donors. This situation was further compounded by a 
weak information flow on capacity gaps, and limited horizontal and vertical 
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linkages among institutions which were supposed to collaborate and coordinate 
similar tasks. ACBF might consider supporting institutionally weakened post-
conflict partner governments to develop multi-sector capacity-building policy 
frameworks that can address real institutional and human capacity needs and 
priorities both from the supply-side (e.g. training of suitably qualified nationals) 
and from the demand-side including human resource planning, appropriate pay, 
incentives and retention within the public sector before any major intervention.10 
Undoubtedly, this would be an imaginative policy conditionality for future 
support. 
 
Building and strengthening capacities of critical national institutions: 
According to most of our interviewees, the capacity of the four post-conflict 
societies to absorb aid effectively was, and continues to be limited by the lack of 
appropriately qualified staff and effectively functioning institutions. Building 
and retaining human resource capacity across the board is one of the most 
difficult challenges facing post-conflict governments and their development 
partners. Human resource management capacity needs to be built within the 
government, civil society, and the private sector if development activities are to 
be implemented effectively. As the four case studies have amply demonstrated, 
the most common response from development partners has been to provide 
targeted key ministries with short-term, highly expensive foreign technical 
assistants and consultants to undertake routine bureaucratic functions. We have 
argued that such interventions should only be viewed as a temporary, gap filling 
emergency measure. They have to be reconciled with, and made complementary 
to longer-term institutional development needs. In post-conflict environments, 
actors and stakeholders from across the spectrum are agreed that there is no 
substitute for a comprehensive civil service reform to restore public sector 
management capabilities. Critical reforms include systems of governance, 
administrative culture, size and cost of the civil service, the pay structure and 
other incentives. The ACBF might consider taking a leadership role by 
addressing the special needs of post-conflict capacity situations, underscoring the 
need for greater comprehensiveness and sustainability of critical programs to be 
initiated and supported. For example, unlike other donors, the UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID) adopted an innovative sector-wide 
approach to Rwandan long-term capacity building needs, rather than a mere 
provision of foreign technical assistants.11 The four studies emphasized that in 
                                                 
10 . As a consequence of conflicts and severe economic crises, the four post-conflict countries in our study 
have been confronted with a dramatic erosion of public sector wages below levels that can either sustain 
employees above the poverty line or attract and retain highly qualified personnel. The net result has been 
brain drain, inefficiency, moonlighting, widespread demoralization and corruption. The four country 
studies propose that addressing public sector wages and benefits should be brought to the center stage of 
every national capacity-building initiative. 
11 . In close collaboration with the Ministry of Education and the World Bank, DFID adopted a long-term 
comprehensive sector-wide approach for the rehabilitation and development of the education sector in 
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post-conflict situations, education can also be one of the most critical and 
strategic instruments toward peace and reconciliation. The history of the misuse 
of schools to channel intolerance and ethnic violence in Rwanda is only too vivid. 
 
Restoring and strengthening social capital: Relatively better funded post-conflict 
reconstruction projects in Rwanda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Uganda 
tended to focus more on rebuilding the infrastructure than on restoring and 
reconstructing institutions and the social fabric of society. The brutal nature and 
the extent of the conflict, along with the ensuing mass migration, profoundly 
damaged the social foundations of these societies. Moreover, war has militarized 
these societies, disrupted existing social organizations and created others. While 
the severity of this problem in post-conflict societies is increasingly recognized, 
neither the World Bank nor other bilateral aid organizations has an obvious 
comparative advantage in this area. ACBF might consider assuming a leadership 
role on this issue, by integrating it into its current briefs on democratic 
governance and civil society. The Foundation’s entry point would be to support 
baseline studies to assess the impact of war on vulnerable groups such as 
children, women and the elderly, and to train teachers who would recognize the 
symptoms of stress, anxiety, trauma and depression. Studies on women, for 
example, would seek to identify men and women’s differing vulnerabilities to 
violent conflict, as well as their different capacities and coping strategies. In 
addition, they would be able to identify unequal power relationships underlying 
various social organizations in order to ensure that women are not further 
marginalized by donor-supported reconstruction interventions. 
 
Deliberate policies to reduce social and economic inequalities: An equally 
profound challenge to reconciliation and reconstruction is for post-conflict 
societies to be supported in designing and implementing policies and programs 
that seek to address the root causes of the conflict. The four studies have shown 
that social inequalities, whether ethnic, regional religious or class-based, share in 
fuelling conflict in the first place. While country-specific PRSPs clearly set out the 
relationships between poverty and long-term structural issues, neither donors 
nor national governments in post-conflict countries have followed the PRSP to 
the letter. Moreover, although subsistence agrarian economies characterize the 
vast majority of the labor in the four countries under study, large-scale 
agricultural reforms which would require significant changes in cultural 
practices as well as land rights hardly get the attention that they require from 
national governments or the international community. ACBF might wish to 
invest in post-conflict capacity-building programs which seek to empower the 
poor through adequate participation in the choice and design of programs as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rwanda. DFID earmarked 21 million pounds in direct budgetary support (primarily for teachers’ salaries) 
and 13 million Pounds in technical assistance within the Ministry of Education for three years. The strategy 
includes all sectors of education in Rwanda. 
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well as targeting them for specific training opportunities that are likely to lead to 
the creation of enduring physical and human assets.   
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